The essence of international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, however, is that they are generally not ordinary crimes, but crimes of obedience: crimes that take place, not in opposition to the authorities, but under explicit instructions from the authorities to engage in these acts, or in an environment in which such acts are implicitly sponsored, expected, or at least tolerated by the authorities. Lee Hamilton and I have defined a crime of obedience as 'an act performed in response to orders from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community'. 
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2 very states that often order, encourage, or tolerate systematic policies or sporadic acts of torture.
When does an ordinary crime become a crime of obedience? It is often the case-in acts of torture as much as in massacre and other gross violations of human rights-that the perpetrators engage in the action willingly, enthusiastically, and with varying degrees of innovation. But 'the fact that a criminal action serves various personal motives or is carried out with a high degree of initiative and personal involvement does not necessarily remove it from the category of crimes of obedience', 3 as long as the action is supported by the authority structure: as long as the perpetrators believe and have good reason to believe that the action is authorized, expected, at least tolerated, and probably approved by the authorities-that it conforms with official policy and reflects what their superiors would want them to do. To be sure, those who commit these crimes with enthusiasm and initiative are more culpable, from a legal and moral point of view, than those who commit them reluctantly in response to explicit orders. However, whether the action is caused or merely justified by explicit or implicit orders from superiors, it can be described as a crime of obedience, on the presumption that it would not have taken place without authorization.
Recognizing these actions as crimes of obedience immediately directs our attention to the other side of the coin: to the crimes of authority that invariably accompany crimes of obedience. For every subordinate who performs criminal acts under official orders or with the encouragement or toleration of the authorities, there is a superior-or typically an entire hierarchy of superiors-who issue the orders and who formulate the policies that require or permit these acts. Higher-level superiors may in fact not have issued specific orders to engage in these criminal acts, but they are the ones who formulate the policies, create the atmosphere, and establish the framework within which officials at intermediate levels of the hierarchy translate general policy directives into specific orders and actions on the ground.
The fact that crimes of obedience take place within a hierarchical structure makes it especially difficult to pinpoint responsibility for them. Subordinates deny responsibility by reference to superior orders. Superiors are often able to deny responsibility because they are various steps removed from the actions themselves and can claim that the initiative was taken at a lower level or that their instructions were misunderstood. The top leadership is protected by the difficulty in establishing causal links between the general atmosphere and policy directives they convey and the practices designed and carried out at lower levels of the hierarchy. 
The policy context
Conceptualizing international crimes as crimes of obedience implies that they must be understood in the context of the policy process that gives rise to them and of the authority structure within which this policy is carried out. To concretize my analysis of the policy context of international crimes, I focus specifically on torture as a case in point. The same logic applies, however, to sanctioned massacres, to systematic expulsions, and to other war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the findings of the investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh 8 -the same man, incidentally, who broke the story of the My Lai massacre and its coverup 9 -make it evident that the abuses were part of a systematic process. They took place in the context of interrogation and were apparently designed to 'soften up' prisoners for questioning by intelligence officers. No doubt, some of the perpetrators engaged in these actions with a greater degree of initiative and sadistic enjoyment than others, but they were operating in an atmosphere of pressure to produce intelligence information from prisoners presumed to be guilty. Whether or not some of the specific abuses and acts of torture were directly ordered, indications are that they were expected, condoned, and encouraged by higher officers. Commanding officers along the different tiers of the hierarchy have been accused, at the least, of exercising insufficient oversight of the conditions of detention and procedures of interrogation that prevailed in Abu Ghraib and other military prisons for suspected terrorists.
In the months following the exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, it became increasingly evident that the treatment of the Abu Ghraib prisoners was not an isolated occurrence, (2004) 80 (12) The New Yorker. (1970) ; S Hersh, Cover-Up (1972) .
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nor was it simply the product of decisions and actions (or inaction) at the local level. occurred, has all the earmarks of physical and mental torture. And, indeed, the accounts presented in these reports are highly reminiscent of what is known about the conditions that have given rise to torture so often in the past anywhere in the world.
While I look to the policy process and the authority structure to identify the major determinants of acts of torture as well as the major correctives against these practices, I
do not minimize the role of individual and cultural differences. With respect to individual gravitate to the role of torturer. Moreover, those operating within the role vary in the amount of enthusiasm, diligence, and innovativeness that they bring to the task. No doubt differences in personality and background play an important part in determining who becomes a torturer and who acts out that role eagerly and with evident enjoyment. But a focus on structural factors helps us understand why many, perhaps most, torturers are not sadists but ordinary people, doing what they understand to be their jobs. I might add that individual differences in readiness to engage in torture may be related as much to people's orientation toward authority as they are to their propensity toward aggression or their sense of compassion.
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Cultural differences-particularly differences in political culture-no doubt also play an important role. Thus, Berto Jongman 13 showed that human rights violations, including torture, were much more likely to occur in non-democratic than in democratic societies 
The use of torture as an instrument of policy
Torture has been practiced by collective actors other than states, such as guerrilla groups or liberation movements, but it has been analyzed primarily as a phenomenon linked to the state. The emergence or reemergence of torture as an instrument of policy in the twentieth century is directly related to the nature of the modern state. In particular, as Edward Peters 14 argues in his historical study, torture arises from the combination of two features of the modern state: its vast power and its enormous vulnerability to state enemies, internal and external. The power of the modern state rests in the extent to which it affects all aspects of the life of its citizens and the resources that it can mobilize to control its population. The vulnerability of the modern state stems from the high degree 14 E Peters, Torture (1985) .
of interdependence of the political, economic, and social institutions required to run a modern society and the resulting ease with which social order can disintegrate and the political authorities can lose control when their legitimacy declines in the eyes of their population or when they confront terrorism and insurgency.
The conditions conducive to the rise of torture as an instrument of state policy are the authorities' perception of an active threat to the security of the state from internal and external sources; the availability of a security apparatus, which enables the authorities to use the vast power at their disposal to counter that threat by repressive means; and the presence within the society of groups defined as enemies of or potential threats to the state (see Table 1 ). When state authorities resort to torture, they can often point to a history of violence directed against the state: in the form of insurgency, guerrilla operations, or terrorist acts.
To be sure, torture may at times be applied to individuals whose only crime is political or religious dissent, or even mere membership in a religious or ethnic community that does not fit into the ruling group's scheme of things. Even where there is a history of violence, the apparatus of torture is not particularly discriminating in the selection of its victims.
Individuals who have not participated in violent action at all may be singled out for torture for any number of reasons: because they are members of or supporters of political opposition groups; because they belong to an ethnic, religious, or even professional category-as happened in Argentina during its "dirty war" 15 -that is generally suspect;
because they are deemed guilty by association (perhaps because they are related to suspects); or simply because they are picked up at random or on the basis of mistaken 
Social processes facilitating a policy of torture
At the level of policy formation, there are three important points at which the perceived threat to the security of the state provides the rationale for a policy of torture, and the power of the state enables it to implement that policy: in establishing the purpose and justification of the torture, in recruiting the agents or perpetrators of the torture, and in defining the targets of the torture (see table) .
First, the essential justification of torture, as has already been proposed, is the protection of the state against internal and external threats to its security-which often means the maintenance in power of those more or less narrow elements of the population that have gained control of the state apparatus. The practice of torture is justified by reference to the particular doctrine of the state's legitimization: maintaining law and order or stability, or the rule of "the people" whom the state claims to embody, or the rule of God, or the survival of Western civilization, or the integrity of national institutions. In war situations, of course, the justification for taking up arms, generally couched in terms of defense against threats to national security and to the vital interests of the state, also covers whatever steps are deemed necessary-including torture-to achieve the military objectives.
Second, the agents of torture are defined as a professional force with a significant role in protecting the state against internal threats to its security. 
Social processes facilitating participation in torture
The three points at which the security concerns and power of the state contribute to a policy of torture at the macro-level-i.e., the justification for torture, the agents of torture, and the targets of torture-can be linked to three social processes that facilitate In the analysis of sanctioned massacres I argued that, to understand participation in massacre or genocide, it is less important to explore the forces that push people into performing such violent acts than to explore those forces that contribute to the weakening of moral restraints against performing these acts-acts that people would normally find unacceptable. Within this framework, authorization helps to define the situation in a way that makes standard moral principles inapplicable: The individual is not acting as an independent moral agent and therefore feels absolved of the responsibility to make personal moral choices. Through routinization, the action becomes organized in a way that eliminates the opportunity to raise moral questions and make moral decisions: The action is divided among many individuals and sub-units of the organization; each individual carries out routine tasks without having to think of the overall product to which these tasks contribute; euphemisms further enable individuals to ignore the overall meaning of the tasks they are performing; altogether, the actions come to be seen as part of a normal job rather than participation in massacre or genocide. Finally, dehumanization of the victims makes it unnecessary for perpetrators to relate to them in moral terms, since it excludes the victims from the perpetrators' moral community.
These three social processes apply to torturers as much as to participants in massacre or other crimes of obedience. In the case of torture, it is particularly clear that these processes are mediated to a significant degree by the torturers' relationship to the state.
The role of authorization is strengthened by the fact that torturers, typically, are not just acting within a hierarchy in which they are expected to obey-and have indeed been trained to obey without question 22 -but they are participating in an action that represents a transcendent mission. They have come to share the view of the authorities that the task they are engaged in serves a higher purpose that transcends any moral scruples they might bring to the situation. They have come to see themselves as playing an important part in an effort to protect the state: to ensure its security and continued integrity, to maintain law and order, or to keep alive the fundamental values of the state that are being subjected to a merciless onslaught by ruthless enemies who are intent on destroying it.
This view of the purpose of the torture project as part of a noble effort, in which the perpetrators are prepared to play their role despite any moral reservations and feelings of repugnance they might have, greatly enhances the legitimacy of the enterprise.
An additional element of the torture situation that contributes to its perceived legitimacy is the participation of medical professionals, who often play an active role by evaluating victims' physical capacity to go through the process, by making sure that the torture does not go beyond the point of causing the victim to die, and by performing other functions.
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Incidentally, the role of physicians in interrogations that are tantamount to torture has also been noted in the Abu Ghraib situation. 24 Physicians have also played a role in developing torture techniques, including brainwashing and related psychological methods of torture. An extreme example of the role of physicians in legitimizing torture and the systematic killing of "undesirables" and enemies of the state is the case of the Nazi doctors, who helped to formulate the biomedical vision underlying the Nazi genocidal programs.
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The justification of torture as a necessary means of ferreting out "the truth" also helps to surround it with an aura of legitimacy, as does the legal context in which it often takes place. One of the common uses of torture is as an adjunct to judicial proceedings, where it is designed to obtain evidence to be introduced into trials. This practice goes back to the early uses of torture-in the Roman period and in the Middle Ages-as a central part of the process of producing a confession, which was deemed necessary to establish the guilt of the accused. 26 E Peters, Torture (1985) .
Routinization of torture is enhanced by the establishment of torturers as a professional group (as described in the previous section), which contributes to normalizing and ennobling their work. Torturers come to see themselves as performing a job, as doing their duty. It is a job that often involves hard work, that can lead to promotion and other rewards, that may offer opportunities to demonstrate innovativeness, that one can excel in and become expert in. Above all, it is a job that one can be proud of because it is perceived as a special profession that provides a significant service to the state and often carries with it membership in an elite corps. Although some torturers may seek out this occupation because of their sadistic inclinations, many are ordinary people who come to this work through a number of different routes.
The torture process itself also shows signs of considerable routinization. It usually involves a series of steps, clearly identified, and following each other in regular sequence.
The different torture techniques, as well as the different torture chambers, are typically designated by special names, often with a euphemistic or ironic quality. These names are not so much designed to hide the reality of what is actually taking place as to give expression to a professional culture with its own rituals and language. 27 The procedures used by torture organizations-including a variety of psychological techniques-are often quite sophisticated. All of this helps to give the work an aura of professionalism, which allows the torturer to perceive it, not as an act of cruelty against another human being, but as the routine application of specialized knowledge and skills.
In dehumanization, too, the state is an important part of the equation. The exclusion of torture victims from the torturer's moral community goes back, in fact, to the early history of torture. In the Roman legal system, torture-as a means of obtaining confessions-was originally applied only to slaves and foreigners, but not to citizens.
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In contemporary practice, as well, torture victims are or are treated as non-citizens. The main source of their dehumanization is their designation as enemies of the state who have placed themselves outside the moral community shared by the rest of the population.
They are described as terrorists, insurgents, or dissidents who endanger the state and are bent on undermining law and order and destroying the community. The view of torture victims as non-citizens, who are not entitled to the protection of the state, was evident in interviews that Heinz 29 conducted with "masters of torture" in Latin America: Once they identified guerrillas as Communists, they saw them as foreign agents and thus, in effect, "denaturalized." Furthermore, torture increased when guerrillas began killing military officers and their families, because they came to be seen as not only outsiders, who are not entitled to the community's protection, but as dangerous elements, against whom the community had a right to protect itself.
A central assumption in the contemporary practice of torture-just as in the early days, when it was used as a systematic part of criminal legal procedures-is that the victims are 28 E Peters, Torture (1985 Indeed, torture is often justified on the grounds that it is the only way to elicit information necessary for the protection of the state and its citizens-such as information about the identity and whereabouts of terrorist leaders or about planned terrorist operations-that the torture victims are presumed to have in their possession.
A contributing factor to the dehumanization of torture victims is the fact that-even when they are citizens of the state that tortures them-they are often outside the ethnic or religious community of the torturers and of the dominant sector of the society. This has been the case, among many others, for Kurds in Iraq, for Bahais in Iran, for Palestinians in Kuwait and in the Israeli-occupied territories, for Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, or for Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. In many cases, the victims' ethnic or religious identity is itself the primary reason for their vulnerability to torture. In other cases, ethnic or religious identity is a factor in dissent or insurgency. In all cases, it facilitates exclusion and dehumanization, thus removing one of the constraints against torture and other serious violations of human rights.
Conclusion
Using torture as the primary illustration, the present analysis suggests some of the conditions under which practices constituting international crimes can become instruments of state policy and the authority structure of the state is fully mobilized to implement that policy: the perception by state authorities that the security of the state is under severe threat-which, at the macro-level, serves to justify these practices and, at the micro-level, contributes to their authorization; the existence of an elaborate and powerful apparatus charged with protecting the security of the state-which, at the macro-level, provides the infrastructure for implementing such practices and, at the micro-level, contributes to their routinization; and the existence of groups within the state or under its control that are defined as enemies of the state-which, at the macro-level, excludes them from protection of the state and, at the micro-level, contributes to their dehumanization.
These conditions are endemic to the autocratic security state. Thus, torture and other gross violations of human rights are much less likely to take place in states governed with the consent of the governed, whose leaders and officials are accountable for their policies and actions. However, even Western democratic societies are not invulnerable to the conditions that tempt state authorities to adopt such practices as policy instruments and that enable them to implement policies that rely on these practices: the perception of fundamental threats to the security and integrity of the state; the existence of bureaucratic organizations charged with ensuring state security, staffed by professionally trained security specialists, and allowed to operate with greater secrecy and less accountability than is customary in democratic societies; and the presence of foreign, poorly integrated, or non-citizen elements within the population or under the state's control that can easily be seen as outside of the contract that obligates citizens and state to one another in a democratic polity. These conditions are particularly likely to arise in the context of armed conflict-whether civil or international-in which the threat to the state is readily personified in an internal or external enemy, bent on violence and destruction. The combination of these conditions can override the constraints and bypass the scrutiny, imposed by democratic values and institutions, that usually stand in the way of gross violations of human rights in democratic societies. These, then, are the conditions that must be addressed-wherever they manifest themselves-as we seek to develop approaches to enhancing accountability for system-generated international crimes, not only on the part of individuals at all levels of the system's hierarchy, but on the part of the system itself.
